The problem of seeking strong Nash equilibria of a continuous game is considered. For some games these points cannot be found analytically, only numerically. Interval methods provide us an approach to rigorously verify the existence of equilibria in certain points. A proper algorithm is presented. We formulate and prove propositions, giving us features that have to be used by the algorithm (to the best knowledge of the authors, these propositions and properties are original). Parallelization of the algorithm is considered, also, and numerical results are presented. As a particular example, we consider the game of "misanthropic individuals", a game (invented by the frst author) that may have several strong Nash equilibria, depending on the number of players. Our algorithm is able to localize and verify these equilibria.


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    Title :

    Interval methods for computing strong Nash equilibria of continuous games


    Contributors:

    Publication date :

    2016-02-17


    Remarks:

    doi:10.7494/dmms.2015.9.1.63
    Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2015): Special Issue on Game Theory and Applications; 63-78 ; 2300-7087 ; 1896-8325



    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



    Classification :

    DDC:    629



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