This paper proposes a two-stage bi-layer game charging optimization model based on the background of non-coordination between a network operator (NO), a distributed generation operator (DGO), and a charging agent (CA). In the first stage, a dynamic virtual price-based demand response (DVPBDR) model is constructed to pre-optimize the charging load with the virtual charging cost as the objective. In the second stage, a strategy for adjusting output deviations based on a bi-layer Stackelberg game model is established, with the economic benefits of each participant as the objectives. Full cooperation mode and bi-layer mixed game are introduced to compare with the bi-layer Stackelberg game in Simulation Analysis. The calculation results show that: (1) the DVPBDR is not constrained by the actual electricity price system and mechanism, and reflect the real influence of price changes on charging demands, thus effectively reducing energy abandonment by 41.76% and net load fluctuation by 53.50%; (2) in the full cooperation mode, there is a conflict of interests and CA suffers financial loss, thus resulting in a reduction in comprehensive benefits by at least 61.08%, compared to the non-cooperative cases; (3) in the bi-layer mixed games, the cooperative gain of DGO and NO is superior than that of the cooperation between DGO and CA, so a relative win-win is achieved in the bi-layer mixed game with DGO-CA cooperation, and the comprehensive benefits is increased by 3.32%; (4) in the bi-layer Stackelberg game, each participant has a completely independent awareness of decision-making and establishes strategies for maximizing its own interests, which results in achieving the optimal comprehensive benefits (increases by at least 44.18% compared to other cases). Therefore, multi-dimensional benefits are realized in the multi-participant charging system with a bi-layer Stackelberg game.
Two-Stage Electric Vehicle Charging Optimization Model Considering Dynamic Virtual Price-Based Demand Response and A Hierarchical Non-Cooperative Game
2023-10-01
Lin , H , Dang , J , Zheng , H , Yao , L , Yan , Q , Yang , S , Guo , H & Anvari-Moghaddam , A 2023 , ' Two-Stage Electric Vehicle Charging Optimization Model Considering Dynamic Virtual Price-Based Demand Response and A Hierarchical Non-Cooperative Game ' , Sustainable Cities and Society , vol. 97 , 104715 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2023.104715
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
/dk/atira/pure/sustainabledevelopmentgoals/affordable_and_clean_energy , bi-layer Stackelberg game , Innovation , Electric vehicles , name=SDG 17 - Partnerships for the Goals , and Infrastructure , /dk/atira/pure/sustainabledevelopmentgoals/partnerships , name=SDG 9 - Industry , name=SDG 7 - Affordable and Clean Energy , /dk/atira/pure/sustainabledevelopmentgoals/industry_innovation_and_infrastructure , day-ahead and intraday charging optimization , dynamic virtual price-based demand response , network
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