The Roadside Unit (RSU) allocation is critical for the functionality and topology control of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks. However, due to the complexity of different transportation scenarios and the challenging coordination among different RSUs, the allocation is still a challenging issue in both the academic and practical industry. In this paper, we utilize the game theoretic RSU deployment to fundamentally improve the allocation of RSUs with practical consideration. Given a set of RSUs of arbitrary covering radii, assuming there is a budget requirement that specifies the total number of RSUs to be placed. In addition, considering the minimum distance requirement between any pair of RSUs, how to select a subset of RSUs to cover the maximum number of Points of Interest (POIs). We consider the selfish behaviors of RSU allocation and apply a game theoretic technique. We propose a mechanism to achieve a small price of anarchy.


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    Title :

    Budget Feasible Roadside Unit Allocation Mechanism in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2020-05-01


    Size :

    144514 byte





    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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