Car-hailing service has a huge impact on people’s travel mode, but the current car-hailing service is mostly using fixed priced, which will damage the enthusiasm of the user, decrease the utilization of vehicle and ultimately reduce the revenue of the vehicle provider. In this paper we proposed a new model that combines the car-hailing service with the auction mechanism to solve above problems. Specifically, we proposed truthful reservation service allocation mechanism (TRSAM) which based on the min-cost path to implement reservation service of car-hailing. We have proved that the TRSAM mechanism are truthful, which protect the interests of vehicle resource provider and user. In the experiment, we compare the TRSAM and with NTR, Greedy-Profit algorithms. Experiment shows that the TRSAM have achieved good results in terms of total revenue, user service rate, vehicle utilization, and user waiting time.


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    Title :

    Truthful Auction Mechanism for Vehicle Allocation and Pricing in Car-hailing services


    Contributors:
    Jixian, Zhang (author) / Jing, Zhang (author) / Qianyu, Xie (author) / Xuejie, Zhang (author) / Weidong, Li (author)


    Publication date :

    2019-09-01


    Size :

    237336 byte




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



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