In this paper, the problems of road congestion and travel efficiency are solved by designing a Stackelberg incentive mechanism. Based on the game theory, the Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) are treated as the followers and the Dispatching Center (DC) as a leader in the Stackelberg incentive mechanism. As the information of other ICVs may not be completely obtained, the respective Nash equilibrium solutions of the optimal route under two different conditions are obtained. By designing the Stackelberg incentive mechanism, the profit function of the DC and the utility function of each ICV is maximized simultaneously when all ICVs choose the optimal routes. Finally, using numerical simulations, the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism for two different conditions is proved.


    Access

    Check access

    Check availability in my library

    Order at Subito €


    Export, share and cite



    Title :

    Application of Stackelberg incentive mechanism in vehicle dispatching


    Contributors:
    Li, Zhiheng (author) / Liu, Fen (author) / Meng, Wei (author)


    Publication date :

    2022-06-27


    Size :

    1009994 byte





    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




    An Incentive Stackelberg Strategy Towards Intelligent Connected Vehicles

    Liu, Fen / Liang, Weihao / Meng, Wei | IEEE | 2021


    An incentive mechanism based on a Stackelberg game for mobile crowdsensing systems with budget constraint

    Sedghani H. / Ardagna D. / Passacantando M. et al. | BASE | 2021

    Free access

    Vehicle dispatching system, vehicle dispatching method, and vehicle dispatching device

    TAKAGI YOSHITAKA / MIKURIYA YUTAKA / NAKAMURA MASAHIDE | European Patent Office | 2023

    Free access

    VEHICLE DISPATCHING SYSTEM, VEHICLE DISPATCHING METHOD, AND VEHICLE DISPATCHING DEVICE

    TAKAGI YOSHITAKA / MIKURIYA YUTAKA / NAKAMURA MASAHIDE | European Patent Office | 2023

    Free access