In case of a congestion in the European air traffic network, the Network Manager issues a regulation which causes flights to be allocated a new slot. The current operating procedure is to use a first-planned first-served (FPFS) policy to allocate new slots to the flights. Since different flights have different cost structures, the FPFS policy may not be optimal in terms of overall economic utility for the airspace users. In the SlotMachine project we aim to build a privacy-preserving online marketplace where airspace users can participate in optimization sessions regarding the allocation of ATFM slots to flights. In this paper, we present different options regarding the deployment of the SlotMachine system,and we discuss the question of the market mechanism that the SlotMachine project must tackle.
Business and Economic Concepts for a Privacy-Preserving Marketplace for ATFM Slots
2022-04-05
2051459 byte
Conference paper
Electronic Resource
English
AN AUCTION-BASED MECHANISM FOR A PRIVACY-PRESERVING MARKETPLACE FOR ATFM SLOTS
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