This study addresses the issue of selecting low-carbon transportation behavior by using evolutionary game theory to examine how the government can use subsidies to encourage both automobile enterprises and customers to choose low-carbon transportation modes. First, an evolutionary game model is constructed that includes the government, automobile enterprises, and customers, and then its stability is analyzed. Finally, numerical simulations are carried out to explore the factors that influence the outcomes. The research findings show that the government’s customer subsidy strategy can increase the willingness of automobile enterprises to adopt low-carbon transportation by up to 50%. The double income parameters of the automobile enterprises have a significant positive impact, while the cost parameters have a significant negative impact. Subsidies are found to be more effective than non-subsidy methods. The government should prioritize subsidizing public low-carbon transportation and give priority to subsidizing automobile enterprises while ensuring that the critical value of automobile enterprises’ profits is met as much as possible. The method of subsidizing automobile enterprises or customers can be appropriately adjusted through income parameter changes. These findings provide important theoretical and practical guidance for developing low-carbon traffic behavior strategies.
A game study on low-carbon transportation behavior considering government subsidies
2023-08-25
461746 byte
Conference paper
Electronic Resource
English
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