Current U.S. Air Force doctrine promotes offensive air operations as the primary means of gaining air superiority and then exploiting that success by attacking enemy forces/LOCs/logistics, etc. on the ground. Such reliance on the offense begs the question whether a thinking enemy could successfully counter that offense through planning and technological investment in a defensive air strategy. This monograph examines whether future technological advances in air warfare justify a shift in U.S. aerospace doctrinal emphasis from offense to defense. To justify a shift in doctrinal emphasis, future technological advances must enable an air defense system to: (1) detect and track incoming aircraft and missiles, (2) identify aircraft and missiles as friend or foe, (3) engage and destroy hostile aircraft and missiles (preferably before they strike their targets), and (4) protect and reconstitute itself.


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