This paper proposes a model of stable vessel-cargo matching with price game mechanism in the dry bulk shipping market. The research aims at mimicking the bid of disadvantaged participants in the process of matching preferred objects. The matching equilibrium and price equilibrium are formulated between the shippers and carriers. A price game mechanism based Gale-Shapley algorithm is developed. Three scenarios of market dominated by shippers, market dominated by carriers, and equilibrium market are discussed in computational experiments. It is showed that if disadvantaged participants bid with the price game mechanism, they may gain more surpluses even in the negative position.


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    Title :

    Stable vessel-cargo matching in dry bulk shipping market with price game mechanism



    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2016




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Print


    Language :

    English



    Classification :

    BKL:    85.00 / 55.82 Güterverkehr



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