Optimal toll design deals with the problem of determining toll which improves performance of a road traffic system. Noncooperative game theory is an excellent tool to investigate possible strategies to analyze such a problem, in which one has to take drivers’ reaction to toll and consequent changes in the traffic flow into account. Depending on the toll structure, the problem may be formulated as a Stackelberg game (when toll is uniform or time-varying) or as an inverse Stackelberg game (when toll is traffic-flow dependent), with the road authority as the leader and drivers as followers. While the inverse Stackelberg approach is more complex to adopt, it has been shown in our previous work that in most situations it brings better outcome for the road authority. This chapter reviews existing results on this topic, discusses our recent case studies within this framework, develops new properties, and brings forward the open issues within this area.


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    Title :

    Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Road Pricing Games: State of the Art and Future Research


    Additional title:

    Springer Ser Reliab Eng


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2014-12-28


    Size :

    19 pages





    Type of media :

    Article/Chapter (Book)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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