Abstract The freight network equilibrium problem consisting of K shippers and a network of M carriers is solved for both the case when carriers act non cooperatively and when they cooperate. In the noncooperative game, the carriers select a cost-plus fixed fee tariff, where the fixed fee is charged if the shipper uses any part of the carrier’s network. If carriers cooperate, then the vertically efficient coalition can offer a single tariff that can be of several forms: two-part, cost-plus, quantity-discount, or minimum-, charge. Both formulations are equivalent, in the sense that an equilibrium exists for each that has identical shipper output, network flows, and shipper and carrier profits. Equilibrium network flows are obtained by solving a single level traffic assignment problem that maximizes the sum of all agents profit. The division of benefits is obtained by solving a linear programming problem. Examples are presented to illustrate the results.


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    Title :

    Optimal Freight Transport Pricing and the Freight Network Equilibrium Problem


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    1996-01-01


    Size :

    24 pages





    Type of media :

    Article/Chapter (Book)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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