This paper considers flight price discrimination between different aircraft types in an analysis of airport congestion under a Stackelberg game. In addition, we introduce a method to determine the specific total flight volume under which there should be no congestion toll because there is no congestion when total flight volume is low. Furthermore, congestion tolls should be levied on all airlines when total real flight production is between the equilibrium flights in a joint-profit maximization scenario and equilibrium flights in a self-profit maximization scenario.


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    Title :

    Airport airside congestion pricing considering price discrimination between aircraft type under a Stackelberg game


    Contributors:
    Zhang, Baocheng (author) / Ye, Zhijian (author) / Lili, Wang (author)

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2020-01-02


    Size :

    14 pages




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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