The Satellite Range Scheduling problem has been traditionally approached in a centralized manner. Existing literature provides a wide variety of sub-optimal algorithms for allocating communication times between a list of satellites and a network of ground stations. The authors have provided an optimal solution for this problem in previous work. But regardless of the optimality, the application of a centralized solution in a distributed system raises the question: could a selfish party improve its schedule by unilaterally deviating from the precomputed centralized solution? Through a game theoretic approach where all the parties act selfishly, the authors show that the system converges to an Stackelberg equilibrium which can be computed in polynomial time for a fixed number of players. Results are illustrated via simple numerical example.


    Access

    Check access

    Check availability in my library

    Order at Subito €


    Export, share and cite



    Title :

    Noncooperative Satellite Range Scheduling with perfect information


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2015-03-01


    Size :

    1820280 byte




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



    Noncooperative Satellite Range Scheduling

    Vázquez Álvarez, Antonio José / Erwin, Richard Scott | Springer Verlag | 2015


    Parameter Requirements for Noncooperative Satellite Maneuver Reconstruction Using Adaptive Filters

    Goff, Gary M. / Showalter, Daniel / Black, Jonathan T. et al. | AIAA | 2015



    Reactive Satellite Range Scheduling

    Vázquez Álvarez, Antonio José / Erwin, Richard Scott | Springer Verlag | 2015


    Noncooperative LEO Satellite Orbit Determination Based on Single Pass Doppler Measurements

    Deng, Ruofan / Qin, Honglei / Li, Haotian et al. | IEEE | 2023