The Satellite Range Scheduling problem has been traditionally approached in a centralized manner. Existing literature provides a wide variety of sub-optimal algorithms for allocating communication times between a list of satellites and a network of ground stations. The authors have provided an optimal solution for this problem in previous work. But regardless of the optimality, the application of a centralized solution in a distributed system raises the question: could a selfish party improve its schedule by unilaterally deviating from the precomputed centralized solution? Through a game theoretic approach where all the parties act selfishly, the authors show that the system converges to an Stackelberg equilibrium which can be computed in polynomial time for a fixed number of players. Results are illustrated via simple numerical example.
Noncooperative Satellite Range Scheduling with perfect information
01.03.2015
1820280 byte
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Noncooperative Satellite Range Scheduling
Springer Verlag | 2015
|Parameter Requirements for Noncooperative Satellite Maneuver Reconstruction Using Adaptive Filters
Online Contents | 2015
|Reactive Satellite Range Scheduling
Springer Verlag | 2015
|Review of Relative Navigation for Noncooperative Spacecraft in Close Range
British Library Conference Proceedings | 2021
|