The issue of airport passenger distribution has always been a concern of all sectors of society, with taxi sharing ranking first among all transportation modes. However, with the increasing competitive pressure brought by ride hailing and the imbalance between supply and demand, airport taxi decision-making has also fallen into a dilemma. This article takes into account the competition of ride hailing from the perspective of taxi drivers, constructs non cooperative game and cooperative game models, and explores the different factors that affect the decision-making behavior of two types of driver groups. The corresponding conclusion is that there is a significant supply-demand imbalance between taxis and passengers. At the same time, the information transparency between the taxi driver group and the ride hailing driver group is relatively low, which affects the cooperation between the groups to achieve the best overall benefits. The research results of this article can provide new ideas for the organization and management of airport taxi scheduling and ride hailing, improving the efficiency of taxi pick-up and passenger service experience after arriving at the airport.
Game Models for Taxi Decision-Making Considering Online Ride-Hailing Competition in Airport
28.10.2023
786672 byte
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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