Due to the lack of technical guidelines and the lack of effective synergy between the various stakeholders, the problem of haphazard parking of shared bicycles is exceptionally serious and has become one of the urgent problems to be solved in the field of urban transport. Since the government and the bike-sharing enterprises have limited rationality, a model of the evolutionary game between them is constructed to analyse its evolutionary stability, in order to put forward effective management mechanisms and policy suggestions for the problem of indiscriminate parking of shared bicycles. The results show that: (1) The reputation loss caused by the government's failure to regulate has a large impact on the government's decision-making, and the government should fulfil its regulatory responsibility even when the regulatory cost is large, in order to achieve a better co-management effect with the enterprises; (2) When the subsidy is small, the government chooses to regulate, and the bike-sharing enterprise chooses the internet of things technological innovation, and at this time, the co-management effect of both of them reaches the best. Moderate technology financial subsidies have an incentive effect on enterprises to carry out IoT technology innovation to optimise parking management; (3) The government introduces an effective penalty mechanism or takes the lead in parking management, which helps to achieve the goal of minimising the government's financial expenditure and social costs.
Parking Management Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government and Bike Sharing Enterprises in the Context of Smart Cities
28.10.2023
1344726 byte
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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