From 2020, all aircraft must be equipped with ADS-B transponders when entering European and American airspace. Although ADS-B has replaced radar as the core of next-generation ATC, ATC still uses radars to cross-validate surveillance data. We can compare ADS-B signals with radar signals to make sure that flight data is correct, so combining ADS-B and radar surveillance will enhance flight safety. Nevertheless, to give full play to the advantages of ADS-B, it is still necessary to reduce the dependence on radar monitoring. To improve air traffic safety further, we also need to take more measures to prevent security threats to ADS-B communications since ADS-B messages are transmitted on public broadcast channels and are not encrypted or authenticated. Attackers may intercept ADS-B messages or forge ghost aircraft using the low-cost SDR. To minimize the harm caused by these attacks, researchers have suggested many methods, such as authentication, encryption, and location verification.
Conclusion and Future Work
Wireless Networks
27.05.2022
10 pages
Aufsatz/Kapitel (Buch)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Conclusion , ADS-B vulnerabilities , The security technology , Modern cryptography , Trajectory validation , Trajectory prediction , Gaussian process regression , Aircraft trajectory prediction , Hardware-based fingerprinting , Channel-based fingerprinting , Event detection , Message anomaly detection , Distance-based method , Reconstruction-based method , Long short term memory , Variational autoencoder , Physical layer Engineering , Communications Engineering, Networks , Computer Communication Networks , Cyber-physical systems, IoT , Computational Intelligence
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