This chapter examines the state of automation in civilian aircraft from two perspectives: when it goes right, i.e., in normal operations, and when it goes wrong, i.e., in non-normal operations. The first perspective considers the crucial role of technological advancements in automated systems, such as fly-by-wire technology and advanced navigation systems that have improved aviation safety. The second perspective draws attention to the grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft following two catastrophic crashes, mainly due to the malfunction of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a new flight augmentation system. It shows that the same automation features supporting the pilot’s task in normal operations can fail unexpectedly in non-normal operations. This study highlights the need for greater transparency in automation systems, better integration with human operators, and improved communication among stakeholders. The findings of this research underscore the importance of a human-centered approach in improving the safety and efficiency of highly complex automated systems. Lessons learned from aviation can be applied to other high-stake industries such as transportation, healthcare, and manufacturing, leading to safer and more efficient human-automation interaction.
When It Goes Right, When It Goes Wrong: Lessons Learned from Automation in Aviation
Progress in IS
The Design of Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence for the Workplace ; Kapitel : 19 ; 329-350
14.03.2025
22 pages
Aufsatz/Kapitel (Buch)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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